Prominent research argues that consumers often use personal budgets to manage self-control problems. This paper analyzes the link between budgeting and selfcontrol problems in consumption-saving decisions. It shows that the use of goodspecific budgets depends on the combination of a demand for commitment and the demand for flexibility resulting from uncertainty about intratemporal tradeoffs between goods. It explains the subtle mechanism that renders budgets useful commitments, their interaction with minimum-savings rules (another widely studied form of commitment), and how budgeting depends on the intensity of self-control problems. This theory matches several empirical findings on personal budgeting.
Introduction
Many studies argue that personal budgeting is a pervasive part of consumer behavior. 1 This practice involves grouping expenses into categories and constraining each with an implicit or explicit cap applied to a specified time period (a week, a month, etc.). 2 While this practice cannot be explained by the classic life-cycle theory of the consumer, it has important consequences. It can account for "mysterious" large differences in wealth accumulation between consumers that time or risk preferences cannot explain (Ameriks commitment . To establish a benchmark, Section 3.2 shows that their result carries over to a world with multiple goods if there is no uncertainty about intratemporal tradeoffs between goods. Intuitively, in this case binding good-specific budgets forces self-1 to choose inefficient consumption bundles, which is akin to wasting resources (i.e., "money burning"). Amador et al. (2006) already showed that money burning is generally suboptimal.
Uncertain intratemporal trade-offs change things substantially, as summarized by the main results of the paper. First, if the goods satisfy appropriate substitutability and normality conditions, optimal commitment plans always involve good-specific budgets when present bias is sufficiently weak, but only a savings floor when present bias is sufficiently strong. Second, fixing a weak bias, for some range of parameters the optimal plans combine budgets with a savings floor, but for another range they rely only on the budgets. By contrast, in Amador et al. (2006) optimal plans always involve a savings floor. 5 The substitutability and normality conditions ensure that the consumption distortions caused by budgets curtail how much self-1 gains in terms of present utility by undersaving, thereby resulting in higher savings. This improvement matters more than those distortions for the time-consistent self-0.
To see the intuition for these results, suppose Ann consumes two goods and is uncertain whether her marginal utility of each good will be high or low. Anticipating her tendency to undersave, she first considers setting a savings floor. This limits overspending if both marginal utilities are high, which makes her want to consume a lot of both goods. If only one marginal utility turns out to be high, however, the floor may not bind; this is especially likely if present bias is weak. In this case, Ann realizes that she will still overspend and this will be mostly driven by the good with high marginal utility. She can then also cap this good with a targeted budget, which raises her savings because now she can overspend only on the good with low marginal utility. By contrast, when present bias is stronger, overspending becomes more severe even for the good with low marginal utility, and the budget leads to a small (if any) rise in savings at the cost of rationing a good with high marginal utility. As a result, Ann prefers to adopt only a savings floor, because it curbs undersaving without distorting consumption.
The results involve some noteworthy subtleties. An agent may adopt budgets that distort consumption spending even though her selves always agree on how to divide every dollar between goods within a period. By contrast, a binding floor distorts only the income division between spending and saving. Perhaps counterintuitively, it is not the case that if a present-biased agent adds budgets to a floor, then a more biased agent should do the same. In addition, agents who use budgets may also set tighter floors, as the budgets' distortions lower the value of leaving more income for consumption. Once budgets are allowed, agents with a stronger present bias may adopt a slacker floor (in contrast to Proposition 5 in Amador et al. 2006) . Section 3 further discusses the results relative to the evidence on budgeting, highlighting findings that other theories struggle to explain. This paper expands our understanding of consumption-savings behavior under self-control problems and the resulting demand for commitment. Since Thaler and Halac and Yared (2014) focus on the role of information persistency. In their setting, an optimal commitment plan can distort future choices, even though they cause no conflict between the agent's selves given today's choice. Persistence links self-1's current information and expected utility from future choices, which can be used to relax today's incentive constraints, as in other dynamic mechanism-design problems. 10 Correlation among self-1's pieces of information is not the driver of the present paper's results.
An older literature examined how rationing affects consumer behavior (Howard 1977 , Ellis and Naughton 1990 , Madden 1991 . By setting a savings floor or good-specific budgets, an agent essentially rations his future selves just as the government may ration consumers. In contrast to that literature, here rationing assumes the role of a commitment device. That literature shows that predicting the budgets' effects is far from trivial. Its insights are useful to identify conditions under which budgets can help the agent.
The model
Consider an agent, Ann, who lives for two periods. In the first, she chooses a consumption bundle c = (c 1 c 2 ) ∈ R 2 + and a level of savings s ∈ R + . In the second period, consumption involves a single good and, hence, equals s. Ann receives her income, normalized to 1, in the first period.
Ann has self-control problems caused by a conflict between a long-run self-0 and a short-run self-1. Their preferences depend on some taste shocks, represented by the state (θ r 1 r 2 ), where θ > 0 and r = (r 1 r 2 ) ∈ R 2 . In each period both selves have the same (concave) consumption utility: u(c; r) in period 1 and v(s) in period 2. In period 1, however, self-0 and self-1 evaluate streams (c s) using, respectively, the utility functions θu(c; r) + v(s) and θu(c; r) + βv(s) For clarity and tractability, for now assume that u(c; r) = u 1 (c 1 ; r 1 ) + u 2 (c 2 ; r 2 ) with ∂ 2 u i (c i ; r i )
Self-1's present bias is captured by β ∈ (0 1). Self-0 knows β (sophistication); we discuss naiveté later. A key novelty of this model is that the state affects both inter-and intratemporal trade-offs. While θ affects only the substitution rate between present and future utility, r also affects the substitution rates between goods within period 1. Hereafter, let ω = (θ r), let G be its distribution, and let be the state space. Distribution G is allowed to have rich forms of dependence as well as full independence across θ, r 1 , and r 2 .
Self-0 delegates the consumption-savings choice to self-1 by designing a commitment plan that dictates which choices self-1 is allowed to implement. In the case of budgeting, such a plan involves spending limits on specific consumption categories, denoted by b i (for budget), or an overall limit on consumption expenditures implemented through a minimum-savings rule f (for floor). Formally, let
Think of c i and s as the share of income allocated to good i and savings. A budgeting plan, B, can then be expressed as
where f ∈ [0 1] and b i ∈ [0 1] for i = 1 2. Let B be the set of all budgeting plans. From the ex ante viewpoint, we call f and b i binding if they bind with strictly positive probability under G. Note that B defines a specific subclass of commitment plans that-though intuitive and tractable-rule out many other possible ways to restrict self-1's choices. Section 4 discusses some intricacies of allowing for more general plans.
In reality, agents commit to their plans prior to observing all the necessary information for making a decision. This creates a trade-off between commitment and flexibility. In the model, first self-0 commits to a plan B, and then only self-1 observes ω and chooses some (c s) from B. Self-0 designs B to maximize her expected payoff from self-1's choices. Note that if self-0 knew ω, the problem would be uninteresting: Setting f at the level of savings that self-0 finds optimal given ω always induces self-1 to choose c and s that maximize self-0's utility.
The goal of the paper is to understand whether and how self-0 sets minimumsavings rules and goods-specific budgets. The problem can be stated as
A solution is called an optimal plan.
Technical assumptions
, where 0 < θ < θ < +∞ and 0 < r i < r i < +∞ for i = 1 2. We only assume that the joint probability distribution G of (θ r 1 r 2 ) has full support (that is, G(O) > 0 for every open O ⊂ ). The conditions on θ and θ rule out the implausible situation where Ann does not care at all about the present or the future. 11 The conditions on r i and r i have bite only when combined with the properties of u listed next.
Differentiability, monotonicity, and concavity The term v is twice continuously differentiable with v > 0 and v < 0. For i = 1 2 and r i ∈ [r i r i ], u i (·; r i ) : R + → R is twice differentiable with u i c (·; r i ) > 0 and u i cc (·; r i ) < 0; also, u i c and u i cc are continuous on (0 1] × [r i r i ]. This implies that u i c is bounded below and away from zero; this nonsatiation property seems plausible to the extent that i refers to food, housing, or entertainment and a period corresponds to a week or a month.
Boundary conditions
We have lim s→0 v (s) = +∞ and lim c→0 u i c (c; r i ) = +∞ for r i ∈ [r i r i ] and i = 1 2. This allows us to focus on interior solutions.
Discussion of the model
Nothing significant changes if Ann receives income in both periods and can borrow in period 1 or if the consumption bundle c involves more than two goods. In fact, the proofs consider the general case of n ≥ 2 goods. It is straightforward to allow for multiple goods in the second period also.
The two selves' preferences are consistent with the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model of Laibson (1997) and with viewing the agent as a household aggregating its members' preferences, which are time consistent but heterogeneous (Jackson and Yariv 2015) . A public finance interpretation of the model is also possible along the lines of Halac and Yared (2014) . In each period, a government chooses spending on a list of public goods and services, c, and saving or borrowing, s, subject to the constraint given by the tax revenues. The government may exhibit present bias as a consequence of aggregating the preferences of heterogeneous citizens (Jackson and Yariv 2015) or uncertainty in the political turnover (Aguiar and Amador 2011) .
The assumed information structure has some redundancy, as both an increase in θ and an increase in all components of r render period-1 consumption more valuable. Nonetheless, it is convenient for differentiating uncertainty about intra-and intertemporal trade-offs and for showing that the former is crucial for budgets to arise (Section 3.2). In a nutshell, this is because it allows for situations where overspending is driven by all goods and situations where it is mostly driven by only some good.
To focus on the issues of interest for this paper, it is assumed that Ann sticks to her plans. This is not a minor assumption, of course, but the literature has proposed several mechanisms that can justify it. These include a desire for internal consistency (Festinger 1962) , the plans' working as reference points (Heath et al. 1999 , Hsiaw 2013 , self-reputation mechanisms (Bénabou and Tirole 2004) , internal control processes that prevent impulsive processes from breaking ex ante rules (Benhabib and Bisin 2005) , and self-enforcement sustained by threats of switching to less desirable equilibria (Bernheim et al. 2015) . Perhaps in reality people are able to carry out their plans provided that they are not too stringent or costly ex post. Even in this case, it is worth understanding which forces lead people to find budgets and floors useful despite their ex post inefficiency. For instance, some present-biased agents may not use budgets not because they cannot stick to them, but simply because they do not find them useful. This can also be valuable for third parties that design commitment devices to help people stick to their plans (such as firms like Mint, Quicken, and Stick).
Optimal budgeting plans

Preliminaries
First of all, treating self-0's payoff as a function of f , b 1 , and b 2 , one can easily establish existence of an optimal plan using the maximum theorem. 12 It is worth defining two benchmark allocations. For each ω, let (c d (ω) s d (ω)) be self-1's choice if granted full discretion, namely, the solution to max (c s)∈F {θu(c; r) + βv(s)}. Another property worth noting is that all consumption goods are normal for both selves. 13 For illustration, consider a fully symmetric model with respect to goods 1 and 2. Since self-1 saves whatever he does not consume (v > 0), we can focus on his choices of c represented in Figure 1 . Note that cs on negative 45°lines closer to the origin correspond to a higher s. To understand the shape of c p , suppose for the moment that θ takes only one value. Start from (θ r 1 r 2 ), which leads to the highest s. If we raise r 1 up to r 1 , c p 1 increases while c p 2 and s p decrease, which means that we move along the south part of the dashed line. If we now start from (θ r 1 r 2 ) and raise r 2 up to r 2 , c p 2 increases while c p 1 and s p decrease; that is, we move along the east part of the dashed line. Proceeding in this way, we can map the entire dashed line; continuity of c p implies that its range extends inside the boundary in Figure 1 . Self-1's systematic undersaving shifts the c d region away from the origin; the stronger his bias, the bigger the shift. Figure 1 also highlights the effect of uncertain intratemporal trade-offs. If r were certain (but not θ), both c p and c d would collapse to an upward sloping line so that the state calling for minimal savings always coincides with that calling for maximal consumption of both goods.
A benchmark: Known intratemporal trade-offs
This section shows that if we remove the uncertainty about intratemporal trade-offswhile keeping that about the intertemporal trade-off and multiple goods-then most of the time optimal plans involve a savings floor but no good-specific budgets. This benchmark helps us disentangle the role of uncertain intratemporal trade-offs from the multidimensionality of consumption.
For the sake of the argument, in this section imagine that self-0 observes r (but not θ) before designing her plan; self-1 continues to observe θ and r. We can then examine the problem defined by (1) and (2) by treating r as fixed. Let G r denote the distribution of θ given r. To state the result, we need some minor conditions about G r . Assume that G r has a strictly positive and continuous density function g r on [θ θ]. Define
As Amador et al. (2006) noted, for many distributions-especially those commonly used in applications-H satisfies the above condition for all β ∈ [0 1]. More generally, if g r is uniformly bounded away from 0 and changes at a bounded rate, the condition on H holds when β is sufficiently high. Importantly, as we will see, high βs characterize the settings with uncertain intratemporal trade-offs where plans using only f are not optimal.
Proposition 1 follows from Amador et al.'s (2006) main result, once we establish the following key point: If self-0 knows r, she can focus on commitment plans that regulate only savings and total consumption expenses, but not how these are divided between goods. The reason is as follows. Unlike a binding f , which distorts only the income division between spending and saving, a binding b i also distorts consumption. 14 Thus, by forcing self-1 to consume inefficient bundles, budgets lower the utility she can get from what she does not save. To lower this utility, however, another method is simply to 14 One way to see this is that the positive Lagrange multiplier for the binding c i ≤ b i introduces a wedge between the goods' marginal utilities. not let self-1 spend all of 1 − s. The literature called this money burning. 15 Spending a share of 1 − s efficiently can achieve any utility obtained by spending 1 − s inefficiently: For all c ∈ R 2 + , there exists y ≤ c 1 + c 2 that yields u(c; r) = u * (y; r), where u * (y; r) is the indirect utility of spending y. Different realizations of the intratemporal trade-offs may affect how self-0 wants to "punish" self-1 for undersaving, holding s fixed. But without that uncertainty, the optimal punishment is unique and can always be achieved with money burning, provided that its amount can flexibly depend on the chosen s. This requires more general forms of commitment than budgeting plans. Formally, let
Given D tc ⊂ F tc , self-1 maximizes θu(c; r) + βv(s) subject to c 1 + c 2 ≤ y and (y s) ∈ D tc .
Lemma 1. Suppose uncertainty affects only the intertemporal utility trade-off. There exists an optimal D ⊂ F with U(D) = U * if and only if there exists an optimal
Thus, when only the intertemporal trade-off is uncertain, whether consumption involves one or multiple goods is irrelevant as long as we allow for general commitment plans.
Proposition 1 goes one step further by showing that the number of consumption goods is irrelevant even when self-1 can use only minimum-savings rules. Given Lemma 1, since the constraint c 1 + c 2 ≤ y always binds for self-1, the problem becomes
This is isomorphic to the problem studied by Amador et al. (2006) . Proposition 1 then follows from their Proposition 3.
Main results
We now return to the model where both inter-and intratemporal trade-offs are uncertain for self-0. The next result is in sharp contrast to the benchmark established before.
Proposition 2. There exists β * ∈ (0 1) such that, if β * < β < 1. Then every optimal B ∈ B must include binding good-specific budgets. 16 The Appendix shows how to derive β * , which can be significantly smaller than 1. Proposition 2 is silent about whether good-specific budgets are always combined with a floor. Section 3.4 shows that both cases are possible.
Do optimal plans always require good-specific budgets? The answer is no.
15 Besides Amador et al. (2006) , papers that study money burning in delegation problems include: Ambrus and Egorov (2013, 2017) and Bagwell (2013, 2016) . 16 All proofs are provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 3. There exists β * ∈ (0 1) such that if β < β * , then every optimal B ∈ B involves only a binding savings floor.
The Appendix shows how to calculate β * , which can be significantly larger than 0 and depends on G only through its support. Using this, we can show that weaker biases suffice to render budgets suboptimal when the uncertainty on intratemporal trade-offs shrinks in the following sense. . Let β * and β * be the corresponding thresholds in Proposition 3. If (r 1 r 2 ) (r 1 r 2 ) and (r 1 r 2 ) (r 1 r 2 ), then β * > β * .
This corollary echoes the benchmark result of Section 3.2: That case corresponds to the limit as r i − r i → 0 for i = 1 2. We saw that under minor conditions, in the limit, essentially β * = 1.
One subtlety of the model is that f , b 1 , and b 2 can bind simultaneously, thereby affecting self-1's choices in possibly complex ways. To handle this, the proof proceeds in several steps, which are sketched here to also uncover the intuitions for the results.
The first step is to consider how self-0 would use f in isolation. In this case, the best f lies strictly between the highest and lowest first-best savings, s p and s p , and rises as β falls. Though similar, this step is not a corollary of Amador et al.'s (2006) results and uses different techniques. Intuitively, self-0 never finds any s < s p justifiable, and f never distorts the chosen c because the two selves have the same consumption utility u. Consequently, self-0 always sets f ≥ s p . Setting f = s p cannot be optimal, as raising f a bit causes a second-order loss when s p (ω) = s p , but a first-order gain when s p (ω) > s p and f binds. A similar logic explains why f < s p . Thus, f has to balance the benefit of curbing undersaving and the cost of causing oversaving. A lower β raises the optimal f because the benefit of raising f grows if self-1 tends to undersave more, but the cost stays the same: When self-0 wants s < f , self-1 does too and f binds for any β. To obtain these properties, the proof shows that the derivative of self-0's payoff in f exists, has a simple form, and is decreasing in β. This uses the fact that we can focus on the states where f binds for self-1 and so s = f , which allows us to immediately infer the effect of varying f on self-0's savings utility, v. Since both selves share u, the effect on self-0's consumption utility can be inferred from self-1's indirect utility from spending 1 − f via Lagrangian sensitivity analysis, which links this effect to the marginal utility of any good at the chosen c. These effects are shown to matter for a set of states with strictly positive probability using the continuity of self-1's choices in f and ω and the full support of G. The second step is to consider how self-0 would use b i in isolation. It turns out that capping even only one good dominates granting self-1 full discretion. To see why, start from the level of b i where it starts to bind (i.e.,
Lowering b i creates a benefit and a cost for self-0 when b i binds. The cost is that it distorts consumption, but this is initially a second-order cost, because the full discretion c d is efficient in the sense of equalizing marginal utilities between goods. The benefit is that b i curbs undersaving, which is of first-order importance for self-0. Overall b i should then benefit self-0, but there is a subtlety: Self-1 should not reallocate income to the unrestricted c j much faster than to s, which is not obvious and need not be true. This key property holds for the additively separable u, but also more generally (see Section 4). Once this is established, the proof uses the fact that both selves share u to show that self-0's payoff can be written as her savings utility scaled by (1 − β) plus self-1's total payoff subject to b i . Lagrangian sensitivity analysis on the latter pins down the second-order negative effects of b i . The former part directly quantifies the first-order positive effects of b i . These effects again matter for a set of states with strictly positive probability for the same reasons as before.
These points highlight the general mechanism whereby multidimensional consumption can help to curb the consequences of present bias. A budget b i incentivizes self-1 to save more because it forces him to choose inefficient bundles-not just to spend less on c i , which he could fully shift to c j -and this inefficiency limits the present utility self-1 can gain by undersaving.
The above two steps are combined to obtain Proposition 2. Intuitively, when present bias is weak, an optimal plan must use budgets because they help improve savings when doing so via f would require it to be too tight. Consider Figure 2 , which focusses on consumption choices and reports the full-discretion and first-best allocations from Figure 1 . Graphically, b 1 defines a vertical line allowing only c 1 s to its left, b 2 defines a horizontal line allowing only c 2 s below it, and f defines a line with slope −1 allowing only cs below it. Thus, in Figure 2 (b) for instance, self-1 must choose c within the diamond-shaped region to the southwest of the solid lines f , b 1 , and b 2 . Uncertain intratemporal trade-offs imply that the states where both selves want to spend the most on c 1 or c 2 (which map to the light-shaded areas) are not the states where they want to save the least (which map to the dark-shaded areas). Indeed, by Remark 1, for i = 1 2 and k = p d,
We saw that if self-0 can use only f , she relaxes it as β rises; that is, the f line moves farther away from the origin. Consequently, f constrains choices in the dark-shaded area, but at some point stops affecting them in the light-shaded areas: compare panel (a) Figure 2 . Optimal budgeting plans: Intuition.
to (b). To curb undersaving in these states, self-0 prefers not to use f , but can add budgets that bind when f does not (as in (b)). As noted, such budgets benefit self-0. The proof of Proposition 3 first shows that it is never optimal to let self-1 save s < s p . Intuitively, if B allows this, raising f up to s p uniformly improves self-0's savings utility; moreover, since all goods are normal, the resulting lower spendable income renders any budget in B less likely to bind and distort c, which again benefits self-0. Now note that when β is sufficiently small, self-1 always wants to save s < s p . Hence, when b i forces self-1 to spend less on c i , he shifts all the money to c j , but not s. Since budgets distort c, if they do not raise s, they cannot benefit self-0 and, hence, be part of optimal plans.
It is now easy to see why shrinking uncertainty about intratemporal trade-offs expands the set of strong biases for which optimal plans use only f (Corollary 1). Budgets are useful to curb undersaving in states with large asymmetry in the goods' marginal utilities (recall Figure 2) . If this asymmetry shrinks, so does the scope for budgets to be useful.
As should be expected, the strongest bias for which optimal plans use good-specific budgets depends on the details of the context. This does not change the main takeaway. As β falls, for every B, it raises the probability of the states where self-1 is constrained by B's actual lower bound on savings at somes ≥ s p . Since in these states binding budgets only distort c, their appeal falls accordingly. How self-0 balances the distortions in those states with the budgets' benefits in other states ultimately depends on their distribution G. Nonetheless, since self-0 can always set f =s, for βs below someβ ≥ β * , every optimal plan must use only f .
Finally, one may think that these results are driven by the fact that budgets and the savings floor are substitute tools in the sense that, everything else equal, optimal plans set a slacker f if they can also use b 1 and b 2 . Their interaction is actually more subtle. By curbing self-1's undersaving, b 1 and b 2 lower the return of tightening f , which can result in a slacker f . At the same time, b 1 and b 2 also lower the return of loosening f because they prevent self-1 from consuming efficiently the extra spendable income, which can result in a tighter f . Therefore, when agents can also use budgets, their savings floor need not vary monotonically with β. This is another difference from Amador et al. (2006) , who predict that f decreases in β. Clearly, all constraints are eventually removed as β → 1, yet this need not occur monotonically along the way.
Optimal plans can involve no minimum-savings rule
This section shows that with multiple goods there exist both settings where self-0 combines budgets with a savings floor and settings where she uses only the budgets. In contrast, in the case of a single good, optimal plans always involve a binding floor. 17 We focus on the symmetric model u 1 (c; r) = u 2 (c; r) = r ln(c), r 1 = r 2 = r > 0, r 1 = r 2 = r > r, and v(s) = ln(s)
There also exist full-support distributions G such that, for every optimal B ∈ B, b 1 and b 2 are binding, but f never binds.
While the result holds for full-support distributions, its intuition can be best explained by considering a three-state case. Let ω 0 = (θ r 1 r 2 ), ω 1 = (θ r 1 r 2 ), and ω 2 = (θ r 1 r 2 ) with respective probabilities g, 1 2 (1 − g), and 1 2 (1 − g). Remark 1 and symmetry imply that
similar properties hold for (c p s p ). By continuity, there exists β < 1 sufficiently high that
hereafter, fix such a β. There exists θ sufficiently close to θ that c Figure 3 (a) represents this situation, focussing again on consumption. Concretely, imagine that Ann has two friends, Becky and Cindy. In a given week, Ann may go out with Becky (ω 1 ), Cindy (ω 2 ), or both together (ω 0 ). Ann likes shopping for clothes with Becky and trying new restaurants with Cindy. When out with both, she enjoys both activities even more. Finally, Ann anticipates that once in the store or the restaurant, she will tend to spend too much.
One can show that if Ann deems going out with both friends sufficiently likely (i.e., g > g * for some g * ∈ (0 1)), then she wants to set a binding f as well as budgets for both goods. In fact, the optimal B satisfies f = s p (ω 0 ), b 1 = c p 1 (ω 1 ), and b 2 = c p 2 (ω 2 ). 19 The intuition is this. If Ann was sure to go out with one friend at a time, she could set f so as to eliminate splurging in ω 1 and ω 2 : this f corresponds to the dotted line in Figure 3(a) . However, this f will be too stringent if she ends up going out with both friends. Since this is very likely, Ann prefers f = s p (ω 0 ). She knows that this f will not bind when she is out with only one friend. But for this case she can curb overspending using b 1 and b 2 ; also, here she can do so without affecting her choice in ω 0 . A simple change of this three-state setting suffices to explain why optimal plans can involve only good-specific budgets. Fix g > g * and all the other parameters except θ. If we increase θ, both selves want to consume more in ω 0 . This eventually leads to a situation as in Figure 3 Figure 3 (b) helps with the intuition. Now Ann is willing to spend even more in ω 0 . Therefore, the budgets she would set to curb splurging in ω 1 and ω 2 start to bind also in ω 0 . As a result, she wants to relax them. She realizes, however, that her first-best spending on clothes and food in ω 0 is just above those budgets. Relaxing them a bit will allow her to curb splurging in ω 1 and ω 2 as well as ω 0 . Since these budgets already push savings above the first best in ω 0 , Ann cannot benefit by adding a binding f .
In short, a weakly present-biased agent may use only good-specific budgets for the following reason. To curb undersaving in states with large asymmetry in consumption marginal utilities, she may prefer to use the budgets rather than a savings floor, which would have to be too stringent. Together the budgets then impose a cap on total spending. If this already ensures sufficiently high savings in states where present consumption is very valuable overall, then any binding floor will have to cause additional oversaving and this inefficiency can exceed the floor's commitment benefits.
Discussion
Theory and evidence
How does this theory relate to the evidence on budgeting and other explanations thereof? One finding is that people may set budgets on "unobjectionable goods like sports tickets and blue jeans" (Heath and Soll 1996) or housing, food, and even charitable giving (Thaler 1985 (Thaler , 1999 . This is difficult to explain with an alternative theory arguing that people set budgets for the goods they find tempting ("vice goods"), although this can be true in some cases. By contrast, present bias combined with uncertain intratemporal trade-offs can lead people to set budgets on "unobjectionable goods," as doing so helps them manage their overall tendency to overspend better than with just a savings floor. Thus, it is not the tempting nature of a good that matters.
Another plausible theory is that budgeting is a technique to simplify the complex matter of household finance (Simon 1997 , Johnson 1984 ). This theory is complementary to the one in this paper, but again struggles to explain some evidence. For instance, it is not clear why computational complexity would lead people to systematically set budgets that seem too strict and to cause underconsumption, as found by Heath and Soll (1996) . By contrast, present-biased people do optimally set budgets that systematically bind and thus exhibit those properties.
The prediction that only weakly biased agents should use good-specific budgets is consistent with some findings in Antonides et al. (2011) . In their sample, people who exhibit a "short-term time orientation" (which according to their description is consistent with strong present bias) are less likely to use budgets than people who exhibit a "longterm time orientation" (a weak bias). Unfortunately, Antonides et al. (2011) do not measure how stringent budgets or floors are in relation to present bias. For that matter, we saw that this relation need not be monotonic. As an alternative explanation, strongly biased agents may not use budgets because they are less sophisticated or able to commit. The anticipated bias (not the true one) is what matters for self-0's problem, however. Therefore, by Proposition 2 underestimating that bias-not entirely, of course-may actually render it more likely that self-0 finds budgets beneficial. If this same agent were instead sophisticated, he might not adopt any budget by Proposition 3. We also saw that once a strongly biased agent can use a savings floor, the reason why budgets do not work for him is not that he cannot honor them: Even if he could, they would strictly lower his utility.
Relaxing separability
The message of the paper generalizes to settings where utility is not separable across goods. Continue to assume that u(c; r) is strictly concave in c and twice differentiable with continuous u c i (c; r) > 0 and u c i c j (c; r) in both arguments for all i and j. We saw that budgets help curb self-1's undersaving if (a) they increase savings and (b) there exist states that call for high consumption of some good, but not of all goods. Property (b) holds if some good is a sufficiently strong substitute of all other goods. Property (a) holds if the capped good is a Hicks substitute of savings (Howard 1977) ; in general, such a good always exists (Madden 1991, Theorem 2). As noted, however, a budget has to curb undersaving faster than it exacerbates overspending on other goods for it to benefit self-0. Given space constraints, these properties are stated directly in terms of allocations. 
Appendix A.6 presents an example that satisfies Condition 1. To state the result, consider a more general class of budgeting plans, denoted by B, which allow us to also set good-specific floors and a savings cap,
where f i b i ∈ [0 1] satisfy f i ≤ b i for i = 0 1 2 and f 0 + f 1 + f 2 ≤ 1.
Proposition 5. Under Condition 1, there exists β * ∈ (0 1) such that, if β * < β < 1. Then every optimal B ∈ B must use distorting good-specific restrictions.
The proof is omitted, because using Condition 1, one can adapt the proof of Proposition 2 to show that plans using only f 0 are strictly dominated for sufficiently high β. Since setting a binding b 0 is never optimal, the result follows.
Do optimal good-specific restrictions always take the form of budgets? The answer depends on the substitutability and complementarity between goods and between each good and savings, which can be affected by the restrictions themselves. A sufficient condition for optimal plans to never use f 1 and f 2 is that all goods are Hicks substitutes and collectively sufficiently normal (see Ellis and Naughton 1990 for a formal statement of this property). Given this, by Theorems 3 and 4 of Madden (1991) two goods remain substitutes independently of which goods are restricted, and Ellis and Naughton's (1990) analysis implies that, given any f 1 and f 2 , relaxing them raises s. Hence, since f 1 and f 2 distort consumption, they strictly harm self-0. Optimal plans use only b 1 and b 2 for the example in Appendix A.6.
General mechanisms
One may wonder what the best among all conceivable plans (not just those in B) looks like and whether it belongs to B. These are important questions, but also hard in the presence of multidimensional consumption and uncertainty. The main challenges come from the income constraint and the complexity of the incentive constraints, which as usual cannot be reduced to only the local ones. Here one can try to apply the insights from multidimensional screening (Rochet and Stole 2003) , but substantive differences remain. First, screening problems allow for transfers. Here one can view the utility from savings as a transfer and use Rochet and Choné's (1998) approach to simplify the incentive constraints and self-0's objective. But the state-wise income constraint (the second difference from screening) cannot be simplified. General techniques exist for handling such constraints (Luenberger 1969) , but unlike in the case of unidimensional consumption, here they do not go far.
Concluding remarks
This paper provides a theoretical analysis of the link between self-control problems and personal budgeting using a parsimonious consumption-savings model with a presentbiased agent. Unlike minimum-savings rules, good-specific spending caps help to curtail overspending because they cause inefficiencies in consumption that lower the return from undersaving, thereby counteracting present bias. Consequently, goodspecific budgets are no free lunch and are used only by agents who are weakly biased and uncertain about their intratemporal trade-offs between goods. Those who are strongly biased or do not face such uncertainty prefer to rely exclusively on a minimum-savings rule.
This theory offers insights into the subtle forces underlying a widely observed phenomenon, which has far-reaching consequences for consumer behavior and welfare by affecting demand differently from satiation and income effects, and by significantly contributing to households' wealth accumulation. The theory matches existing empirical findings, such as that people often set budgets for goods normally not viewed as tempting and only those who exhibit weak present bias seem to use budgets. The theory also suggests new directions for enriching the sparse evidence on budgeting by demonstrating its dependence on uncertain intratemporal trade-offs, and for designing commitment devices whose functions are targeted to the right type of present-biased agents. 
denote by B f the corresponding policy in B.
Lemma 4. Define (f ) = {ω ∈ : s d (ω) ≤ f } and let c f (ω) be the maximizer of u(c; r) subject to
Proof. Given f and any ω, definẽ
Since u(·; r) is strictly concave in c, so isũ(·; r) in f by standard arguments. Hence,Ũ(·; ω) is also strictly concave in f . Now considerŨ (f ; ω). Whenever it is defined,Ũ (f ; ω) = θũ (f ; ω) + v (f ). By first-order conditions of the Lagrangian definingũ(f ; r), we have u c i (c f (ω); r) = λ(ω; f ) for i = 1 n, where λ(ω; f ) is the Lagrange multiplier for n i=1 c i ≤ 1 − f . Since c f (ω) is continuous in f for every ω, so is λ(ω; f ). By Theorem 1 of Luenberger 1969, p. 222 
For any f , denote by (c f s f ) self-1's behavior as a function of ω under B f . By the maximum theorem, (c f (ω) s f (ω)) is continuous in both f and ω. Since, fixing any s, both selves would choose the same c in every ω, by definition
Consider any f >f and recall that (f ) = {ω :
the first equality holds because s f (ω) = sf (ω) for ω / ∈ (f ) and s f (ω) = f for ω ∈ (f ). Divide both sides by f −f and consider the limit as f ↓f . First, for all ω, we have
SinceŨ (f ; ω) is continuous in ω and f as illustrated by (3), |Ũ (f ; ω)| is bounded by some M < +∞ for (f ω) ∈ [s d s p ] × . Therefore, by Lebesgue's bounded convergence theorem,
Consider now the second part of the limit. Again, by concavity ofŨ(·; ω) and since
Observe that (f ) ∩ ( (f )) c = {ω :f < sf (ω) ≤ f }, which converges to an empty set as f ↓f . Since then the second part of the limit converges to zero as f ↓f , for everŷ
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Fix r. Recall the definition of U (D) in (1) 
Suppose (χ t) that satisfies Conditions 1 and 2. Then, by our discussion on money burning before the statement of Lemma 1, there exists a function ϕ : [θ θ] → R + such that u * (ϕ(θ); r) = u(χ(θ); r) and ϕ(θ) ≤ n i=1 χ i (θ) for all θ ∈ [θ θ]. Hence, letting τ ≡ t, we have that (ϕ τ) satisfies both Conditions 1 and 2 .
Suppose (ϕ τ) satisfy Conditions 1 and 2 . For every θ ∈ [θ θ], let
Then, by definition, u(χ(θ); r) = u * (ϕ(θ); r) for all θ ∈ [θ θ]. Letting t ≡ τ, we have that (χ t) satisfies both Conditions 1 and 2.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof uses the following three lemmas.
Lemma 5. When self-0 can set only f , every optimal f satisfies s p < f < s p .
Proof. We will show that (f ) > 0 for all f ∈ (s d s p ] and (f −) < 0 for f = s p . Recall that (c f s f ) is continuous in f for every ω and, therefore, so is (f ). These observations imply that every optimal f * is in (s p s p ).
n+1 + subject to s + i c i ≤ 1 and s ≤ f . Letting μ(ω) and φ + (ω) be the corresponding Lagrange multipliers, the first-order conditions are 22 v (s) = μ(ω) + φ + (ω) and θu c i (c; r) = μ(ω) for all i. Clearly, s = f and φ + (ω) > 0 for ω ∈ + (f ). Also, conditional on s = f , both selves would choose the same c in state ω, which is, therefore, c f (ω). Using (3), it follows that, for every i,
For ω ∈ − (f ), consider the fictitious problem of maximizing θu(c; r) + v(s) for (c s) ∈ R n+1 + subject to s + i c i ≤ 1 and s ≥ f . Letting μ(ω) and φ − (ω) be the corresponding Lagrange multipliers, the first-order conditions are v (s) = μ(ω) − φ − (ω) and θu c i (c; r) = μ(ω) for all i. Clearly, s = f and φ − (ω) ≥ 0 for ω ∈ − (f ). Also, conditional on s = f , both selves would choose the same c in state ω, which is, therefore, c f (ω). Using (3), it follows that, for every i,
where the last equality follows because either − (f ) = ∅ or φ − (ω) = 0 for ω ∈ − (f ). The function φ + (ω) is strictly positive over (f ) ∩ + (f ). We need to show that
If this set is nonempty, we are done because G has full support. Both • (s p ) and + (s p ) are nonempty. Suppose that
converging toω. We have that lim ω n →ω inf s d (ω n ) ≥ s p > s d (ω) . But this violates the continuity of s d -a contradiction. Now consider f = s p . Again using Lemma 4, we have
where φ − (ω) > 0 for all ω such that s p (ω) < s p . Therefore, (s p −) < 0. 23 22 Here-and in the other proofs-the complementary slackness conditions are omitted for simplicity. 23 It is easy to see that the optimal f satisfies f ≤ s p . Suppose f ∈ (s p 1). Then, for all ω, self-1 chooses
is strictly concave. It follows that self-0's payoff is strictly larger under f than under f .
Let E(β) be the set of optimal floors and let u * (y; r) be the indirect utility of spending y ∈ [0 1].
Lemma 6. The set E(β) is decreasing in β in the strong set order. 24 The largest optimal f converges monotonically to s p as β ↑ 1. There exists β > 0 such that E(β) = {f } for all β ≤ β, where f satisfies f < s p and
where the inequality uses (4). By standard results, E(β) decreases in the strong set order. Define f (β) = max{f : f ∈ E(β)}. Since f (β) ≥ s p for all β and f (·) is decreasing, lim β↑1 f (β) exists; denote it by f (1−) ≥ s p . Clearly, f (1) = s p . Now suppose that f (1−) > f (1). By a similar argument, for any f > s p , lim β↑1 (f ; β) exists and equals − − (f ) φ(ω) dG < 0. Therefore, for β close enough to 1, f (β) ≥ f (1−) cannot be optimal-a contradiction that implies f (1−) = f (1).
Note that 
From the proof of Lemma 4, u(c f (ω); r) =ũ(f ; ω) is strictly concave in f for all ω. Thus, the maximizer of (5) is unique. From the proof of Lemma 5, the derivative of (5) is negative at s p and, hence, f < s p .
We now show that self-0 benefits from using only b i .
Lemma 7. Fix i and consider plans B b i with b j = 1 for all j = i and f = 0. There exists
Proof. 
where the first inequality uses u j cc < 0 and u
Since v is continuous and strictly positive everywhere and
for ε > ε > 0, and lim ε→0 κ(b ε 1 ) = 0 because κ(·) is continuous. Therefore, there exists ε * > 0 such that κ(b ε * 1 ) < κ(1 − β)K. It follows that for all ε ∈ (0 ε * ], expression (8) We can now complete the proof. By Lemma 6, f (β) falls monotonically to s p when β ↑ 1. Also, for every i = 1 n, s d (θ r i r −i ; β) rises monotonically to s p (θ r i r −i ) as β ↑ 1. By Remark 1, s p (θ r i r −i ) > s p . Given this, define
Clearly, β * < 1 and, for every β > β * , we have s d (θ r i r −i ; β) > f (β) for at least some i = 1 n. Hereafter, fix β > β * and any i that satisfies this last condition. Then, for every β < β * * , we have βv (s(ω)) < θu i c (c i (ω); r i ) for all i = 1 n. Therefore,
Finally, let β < β * = min{β β * * }, where β > 0 was defined in Lemma 6. Let B β ∈ B be an optimal plan for β. By Lemma 8, σ β ≥ s p . The previous result then implies that
where the first inequality holds since u(c(ω); r) ≤ max {c∈R n + :
and from the definition of f in Lemma 6. If B β involves budgets that bind for a set with G( ) > 0, then u(c(ω); r) < u(c σ β (ω); r) for all ω ∈ and U(B β ) < U(B f ). Therefore, optimal plans can only use f .
Finally, let r , r, r , and r satisfy the properties in Corollary 1. Then s p = s p (θ r ) ≥ s p (θ r) = s p with strict inequality if r = r (Remark 1). Similarly, for β ∈ (0 1),
with strict inequality if r = r. The definition of β * * in (9), the strict concavity of v, and r i ≥ r i imply that β * * > β * * . The definition of β in the proof of Lemma 6 and the fact that s d is strictly increasing in β imply that β > β. Therefore,
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
The proof is constructive: It first establishes the claimed properties for the illustrative three-state setting in Section 3.4, which are then used for the general result.
The term on the right-hand side is well defined; also, for all
Hereafter, assume that g > g * .
Claim 2. Fix i ∈ {1 2}. Suppose self-0 knows that the state is ω i and can only use b i .
Proof. Let i = 1. The argument in the proof of Lemma 7 implies that it is optimal to set b 1 < c d 1 (ω 1 ). To find the optimal b 1 , consider first self-1's problem to maximize θ[r ln(c 1 ) + r ln(c 2 )] + β ln(s) subject to s + c 1 + c 2 ≤ 1 and c 1 ≤ b 1 . Since both constraints must bind, this becomes max s∈[0 1] {θr ln(1 − b 1 − s) + β ln(s)}. The solution is characterized by the first-order conditions, which lead to
Given this, self-0's payoff in ω 1 as a function of b 1 becomes (up to a constant)
The optimal b 1 is again characterized by the first-order condition, which leads to
Finally, c p 1 (ω 1 ) results from maximizing θ[r ln(c 1 ) + r ln(c 2 )] + ln(s) subject to s + c 1 + c 2 ≤ 1. Substituting s = 1 − c 1 − c 2 and combining the first-order conditions yields
Claim 3. Fix i ∈ {1 2}. Suppose self-0 knows that the state is ω i . Then she strictly prefers to use only b i rather than only b −i .
Proof. Let i = 1. Similar calculations to the proof of Claim 2 imply that if self-0 can impose only b 2 , she sets
We want to argue that self-0's payoff in ω 1 is strictly larger if she uses only b 1 as in (11) than if she uses only b 2 as in (12). Substituting the choices implied by b 1 and b 2 into self-0's utility function, one can show that b 1 in (11) is strictly better than b 2 in (12) if and only if
To show that this holds, consider ϕ(β r) = (1 + θr) ln(β + θr) for 0 < β < 1 and r > 0. Since ϕ βr (β r) = ∂ ∂r
is strictly decreasing in β. Continuity gives the result.
Claim 4. If B is optimal, then f can bind at most in ω 0 .
Proof. If f binds in all ωs, then B is weakly dominated by a policy using only f and no budgets, as they distort c without raising s. Given g > g * , by Claim 1 the latter plan is strictly dominated by one using only f = s p (ω 0 ). Clearly, if f binds in ω 1 and ω 2 , it must bind in ω 0 . Now suppose that f binds only in ω 0 and another state, say, ω 1 . There are two cases: Case 1: b 1 does not bind in ω 2 . Then removing b 1 leads to a weakly superior policy in which f binds only in ω 0 and ω 1 . Given g > g * , however, the gain from raising f above s p (ω 0 ) to improve self-1's allocation only in ω 1 does not justify the loss created in ω 0 . Therefore, B is again strictly dominated by the policy obtained if we remove b 1 and set f = s p (ω 0 ).
Case 2: b 1 binds also in ω 2 . This implies that f has to bind in all ωs. Indeed, since b 1 binds in both ω 1 and ω 2 , self-1 chooses c 1 = b 1 in both states; also, since good 2 is more valuable in ω 2 than in ω 1 , self-1 wants to allocate more income to good 2 than to s relative to ω 1 , and so f also binds in ω 2 . But we know that such a policy is strictly dominated by using only f = s p (ω 0 ). Proof. Without loss, consider b 1 . Suppose first that b 1 binds in all states, which implies that c 1 (ω i ) = b 1 for all i = 0 1 2. There are five cases to consider:
Case 1: Neither b 2 nor f binds in any state. Since θ > θ, c 2 (ω 0 ) > c 2 (ω 2 ). The plan cannot be optimal because, given b 1 , self-0 would be strictly better off by adding an f that binds only in ω 0 : Even if b 1 were binding for self-0 in ω 0 , she would strictly prefer c 2 < c 2 (ω 0 ) of good 2.
Case 2: b 2 binds in all states. Then c 2 (ω i ) = b 2 and s(ω i ) = 1 − b 1 − b 2 for all i = 0 1 2. This plan is strictly dominated by one that imposes only f = 1 − b 1 − b 2 (because budgets are distorting), which is, in turn, strictly dominated by the plan with only f = s p (ω 0 ) given g > g * .
Case 3: b 2 binds in no state. Then, as in Case 1, for B to be optima, f must bind at least in ω 0 and only in ω 0 by Claim 4. Since, by assumption, b 1 binds in all states, it must be that b 1 < c p 1 (ω 1 ). Indeed, if b 1 ≥ c p 1 (ω 1 ), the optimal f equals s p (ω 0 ); since, by assumption, c p 1 (ω 0 ) < c p 1 (ω 1 ), b 1 cannot bind in ω 0 . It follows that with regard to ω 0 and ω 1 , self-0 would be strictly better off replacing b 1 and f withb 1 = c p 1 (ω 1 ) andf = s p (ω 0 ). With regard to ω 2 , self-0 would be better off by replacing b 2 withb 2 = c p 2 (ω 2 ): By Claim 3, even if b 1 were perfectly tailored for ω 2 , it would be strictly dominated in ω 2 byb 2 . bind in ω 0 , and (c) f cannot bind in ω 1 and ω 2 , as self-1's choice of s strictly exceeds f in ω 1 and ω 2 under all B ∈ B(1).
Take any B ∈ B(α) and fix its b 1 and b 2 . The f completing B must be optimally chosen given b 1 and b 2 . We claim that it must satisfy f ≤ 1 − b 1 − b 2 = k for α sufficiently close to 1. Suppose not. Consider self-0's expected gain from imposing f > k. The gain in ω 0 is Since V (f ; ω) ≤ V (ŝ(ω); ω) andŝ(ω) ≥ k for all ω ∈ , for all f ≥ k, (13) is bounded above by
Note that the right-hand side of this expression depends on α only via k. Now focus on V (k; ω 0 ). For every f > k, (a) f always binds, because k > s p (ω 0 ) and, hence, self-1 wants to choose s < f , (b) only one b i can bind, because if both bind, then s(ω 0 ) = k < f , which is impossible, and (c) one b i never binds, because goods are normal, so for all f > k, self-1's chooses c i (ω 0 ) < b i for at least one i = 1 2. Without loss, suppose that b 2 never binds. If we remove b 2 , V (k; ω 0 ) equals self-1's indirect utility under the plan defined by k ∈ [k 1] and b 1 only, denoted by V (k; ω 0 b 1 ). By the same argument in Lemma 4, V (k; ω 0 b 1 ) is continuously differentiable in k for k ∈ (0 1] and V (k; ω 0 b 1 ) = −λ(ω 0 ; k), where λ(ω 0 ; k) is the Lagrange multiplier associated to s ≥ k. Using the Lagrangian that defines V (k; ω 0 b 1 ), we have λ(ω 0 ; k) = θ u 2 c (c 2 (ω 0 ; k); r) − βv (k). Note that λ(ω 0 ; k) > 0 for all k ∈ [k 1], because such floor levels must always bind for self-1. Moreover, λ(ω 0 ; k) is strictly increasing in k ∈ [k 1] because v is strictly concave, u i cc < 0, and c 2 (ω 0 ; k) is nonincreasing in k by normality of goods. Therefore, V (k; ω 0 ) = −λ(ω 0 ; k) for all k ∈ (k 1] and V (k+; ω 0 ) = −λ(ω 0 ; k), where the plus denotes the right derivative. 27 Moreover, V (k; ω 0 ) is strictly decreasing in k.
Observe that
which is strictly negative. This is because b 1 < c p 1 (ω 0 ) and b 2 < c p 2 (ω 0 ) by Lemma 10 since α is close to 1, which implies that b 1 and b 2 must bind for self-0; consequently, f = k and b 1 must also bind for self-0. The right-hand side of (14) coincides with the negative of the Lagrange multiplier associated with s ≥ k in self-0's problem that also includes c 1 ≤ b 1 .
Recall that k depends on α-hence, denote it by k α -and consider gV k α ; ω 0 + αg + (1 − α) (1 − β)v (k α )
This is strictly negative for α = 1, in which case k 1 = 1 − b * 1 − b * 2 . By continuity of (15) in (α k) and upper hemicontinuity of B(α), there exists ε > 0 such that (15) is strictly negative for α ∈ (1 − ε 1]. By the monotonicity of v and V (·; ω 0 ), (15) is strictly decreasing for k ≥ k α .
Finally, for every α ∈ (1 − ε 1] and f > k α ,
We conclude that self-0 is strictly worse off by imposing a binding f in addition to b 1 and b 2 , and, hence, every optimal B must use binding budgets for both goods, but no binding f .
A.6 Example of non-additive utility
Suppose that Assume that e > 1, 0 < γ < 1, and e ≤ 1/γ. By standard calculations, given total expenditures y ∈ [0 1] in a period, the optimal allocation to good i is 
